schooling: "I knew how to sleep on a bed, pray to Jesus, comb [2] , for example, focused our attention beyond the overt aspects of the person's situation to the covert, and to the private meaning of public symbols. The myths and rituals of cultural dramas were now related to the fantasies and stereotyped acts of individual lives.
Most impressive was the change as Yale psychiatry's previous isolation from the other departments of the Institute of Human Relations gave way to open communications. This allowed staff and residents to know people who lived in the same buildings, such as John Dollard, Irvin Child, until his early death, Ralph Linton, and others in the then burgeoning culture-personality research area.
Fritz Redlich, very much the bridging person, who connected the newly vibrant social, biological and psychoanalytic streams in the department, was fond of an expression which I have plagiarized from time to time. Psychiatry, he said, rests on a tripod. One leg is made up of the medical and biological sciences; one, of what we learn from psychoanalysis and psychotherapy; the third of experimental psychology, and the sciences of social structure and culture, such as sociology and anthropology. I don't remember if he then used the term, "behavioral sciences," and I believe that Ed Stainbrook, who was with us from 1952 to 1955; or thereabouts, may have laid claim to that label-but as I look back it seems that our developing concept of social psychiatry was very much concerned with the relationships between clinical concepts and the behavioral science disciplines basic to them.
Like a good scholar and administrator, Dr. Redlich also made sure that his departmental tripod was not lopsided and that the parts were as firmly connected as possible. Thus, for example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s when we studied lobotomized patients-in an era when many such procedures were being doneneurophysical change was studied in terms of its psychodynamic consequences and in terms also of the patients' familial, community, and social class contexts. When Hal Rosvold and I wanted to extend our studies to infrahuman primates, it was natural in that environment to think of observing the effect of brain lesions on the social structure and interaction processes of a rhesus macacus group, rather than upon individual monkeys living alone in isolation cages. Caudill had already alerted us to the importance of studying social structure and interaction processes on the psychiatric wards. And this emphasis on the inter-relatedness of the neurobiological, the sociocultural and the psychodynamic continued as the department grew to include much more ambitious studies in psychobiology and psychopharmacology during the ensuing decades.
The message it seems to me is clear: the study of man as a social creature cannot be separated from understanding him as a reflective, introspective one. Nor can it be pretended that he exists outside of an evolving physical body. Social psychiatry, if we decide that there is such an entity, is not an exclusionary, but an inclusive domain. Context and behavior, mutually influenced, cannot be understood for any living thing, one without the other. This is more and more apparent with increasing levels of social system complexity-and its corollary in the increasing numbers of options about which individuals must make decisions; particularly as the force of socially inherited rules becomes less.
Social psychiatry then, refers to an area of scholarship, a body of knowledge and a way of thinking about human behavior. Some clinical skills may be derived from this body of knowledge, but the skills as such do not constitute the field. The organization and delivery of mental health services; care for high risk groups such as migrants, members of ethnic minorities or people at the lowest socio-economic status levels; these are informed by a knowledge of society and culture in relation to ordered and disordered behavior. The social psychiatrist can teach therapeutic technicians, or designers of health service systems, or even politicians who formulate health related laws-but his (or her) expertise is not in one or another of these applications or skills. It is rather in the area of knowledge from which they are derived. Basic to this area are traditional academic disciplines, in particular, philosophy and the humanities as well as the social sciences. And the number of disciplines with immediate relevance to behavior is growing.
Economic utility models, thus, are widely used in attempts to understand the reproductive and contraceptive decisions ultimately important for preventive psychiatry. The "dismal science" has also come to the forefront in policy decisions as their hidden social costs become apparent. For example, it has been shown that the outcome of an acute schizophrenic episode is the same after six months, whether the patient was hospitalized or kept at home. But there is a cost-the patient treated at home during the stormy initial period of his disorder exerts a significantly disturbing influence on his family, children, and community. Patients are discharged from hospitals under the control of tranquilizing drugs, but there is a cost-as the birthrate of children of schizophrenic patients has increased in consequence of policies of early discharge.
I do resonate sympathetically to W.H. Auden's admonition: "Thou shalt not sit with statisticians nor commit a social science," [3] but social psychiatry without the social sciences seems to me as hollow as internal medicine without physiology or biochemistry. These sciences are concerned with the social organizations in which human beings exist-individually and collectively; with the cultural scripts which in one way or another guide their behavior; with the ways in which behavior is defined as normal or deviant; and-if the latter-with the social basis of systematic attempts to modify it.
Philosophy is important to social psychiatry in many ways-but most of all as it includes the study of ethics. Fritz Redlich recognized the ethical issues early in the course of his research career. This became explicit in our ruminations about the morality of admitting anthropologist Bill Caudill to the Yale inpatient service as a pseudopatient, a concealed observer, in 1951. The ethics of psychiatric in contrast to other types of medical care, especially in terms of availability to the public, were alluded to in Fritz's studies outlining the differences in attitudes and behavior of the "directive-organic," "analytic-psychotherapeutic," categories of psychiatrists. But ethical issues really became a significant focus of attention after the pioneering study with Sandy Hollingshead relating social class membership to the treated prevalence of different types of illness. It was clear that people who grew up in lower class families, with less money, less confidence in themselves, and less access to sources of societal power tended to be treated suppressively through confinement, or methods such as electroshock, while those from more advantaged backgrounds had the privilege of a psychotherapeutic relationship with their doctors, and were encouraged rather than discouraged in their struggles for individuality. Goffman's concept of the total institution, linking the dynamics of life in monasteries, prison units and boarding schools to that of the mental hospital, was one of a number illuminating the nature of psychiatric institutions as behavioral change stations for non-conforming members of society.
To the degree that "mental illness" and "mental health" are socially rather than biologically defined, the psychiatrist becomes in varying degrees part of the mechanism of socialization and social control. This may be totally compatible and egosyntonic for him as he is a creature of his own culture. Thus, the psychiatrist may state and believe, that a particular "patient" is being made into a "better" person as his behavior is made to conform to particular social requirements. Or This leads me, finally, to an area of speculation. I believe that mental health requires redefinition in terms of justice: equal opportunity for those experiences which permit the realization of human potentials. These are opportunities for education; meaningful work; the maintenance of physical health; information and services which permit some control over one's bodily functions (as, for example, through family planning); and, especially, the opportunity to be self-determining in terms of freedom of thought and creative expression.
Students of social psychiatry in particular should be concerned with the exploitation of health and medicine in the name of political ideologies; the use of professional specialists and psychiatric diagnosis to divest persons of responsibility for their consciously taken unpopular acts; and with avoiding the subtlest and-for us-the most seductive form of coercion, that is, making individual wishes and desires conform to public norms.
If we are concerned with the intertwined mental health and illness of all the world's peoples, we must also confront the twin factors of poverty and minority status which, regardless of place and culture, have more universal commonalities than particular differences. Minority status may be associated with any socially visible ethnic characteristic. But for most minority group people, poverty is salient. Living at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder is not only bruising to self-esteem, optimism and initiative; its corollaries in lack of education and literacy, lack of personally fulfilling work, and the uprootedness of migrants to the city, have specific consequences for mental health and illness.
Beyond these, the physical corollaries of poverty in malnutrition, illness and reduced life span demonstrate repeatedly the interconnectedness of all aspects of health. Health, in the crudest sense, means the opportunity to begin life free of avoidable handicaps-the burdens which a blind and insensitive society imposes through intrauterine or extrauterine illness, injury or deprivation, upon the new human being. The capacity for individual and collective initiative and coping which we regard as central to mental health cannot survive in contexts characterized by inequity and injustice-whether in the form of conscious coercion by government planners, or that lack of essential opportunity which can be present in any free but unaware, uncaring, society. I think that social psychiatry as an emerging aspect of our specialty has increased our awareness, raised our consciousness to the consequences of our professional acts for other people, and has made us more intelligently caring. I would like to congratulate Fritz Redlich for his truly significant role in this development.
